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CASE COMMENTS

Before a liability insurance company can be held liable in excess
of policy limits, it must be guilty of either "negligence" or "bad
faith" in refusing to settle within the policy limits. Although these
are theoretically two separate tests, in practical application the
results may be very similar. Since the Virginia court"s and the
District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia,34 along
with the West Virginia Legislature in the Safety Responsibility
Law"5 have all endorsed the "good faith" rule, it is most likely
that when the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals is confronted with the question they will follow the majority and require
that refusal to settle be a "good faith" refusal.
RichardEdwin Rowe

Juvenile Delinquency-Jurisdiction-Double Jeopardy
A juvenile, properly confined by the Juvenile Court of Ohio
County to the West Virginia Industrial School for Boys for automobile theft and breaking and entering, was placed in the Taylor
County jail because of misconduct at the school. Juvenile Court
of Ohio County ordered the youth returned to it whereupon he was
transferred, apparently without hearing, to the Intermediate Court
of Ohio County. Upon indictment and plea of guilty to auto theft,
he was placed on probation. Later he violated probation and
was sentenced to the penitentiary. Petitioner successfully sought a
writ of habeas corpus from Marshall County Circuit Court alleging
unlawful and illegal detention. The warden of the state penitentiary brought error. Held, reversed. The Intermediate Court
of Ohio County had jurisdiction of the subject matter and the
petitioner waived his right to object to the jurisdiction over his
person by remaining silent. Validity of conviction is not dependent
upon how one gets before the court and double jeopardy is inapplicable in juvenile court proceedings. Brooks v. Boles, 153 S.E.2d
526 (W. Va. 1967).
The West Virginia Code provides that the jurisdiction of a
juvenile court over one adjudged to be a delinquent continues
3Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Price, 206 Va. 749, 146 S.E.2d 220 (1966).
34lnland Mut. Ins. Co. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 152 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.
W. Va. 1957), aff'd on rehearing,251 F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 1958).
35 W. VA. CODE ch. 17D, art. 4, § 12(f)(3) (Michie 1966).
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"until he becomes twenty-one years of age unless discharged prior
thereto or is committed to a correctional or other institution."'
There is a question as to whether the Ohio County Juvenile Court
had the authority to order the petitioner returned to it after the
original commitment to the industrial school. According to the
code a person subject to the jurisdiction of a juvenile court may be
brought before it by only one of two means: "(a) By petition
praying that the person be adjudged neglected or delinquent (b)
certification from any other court before which such person is
brought, charged with the commission of the crime."2 Considering
this section of the code with that part of the same section above
mentioned concerning termination of jurisdiction it appears that
the Juvenile Court of Ohio County did not have jurisdiction over
the person of the petitioner. The court made no note of these
provisions of the code and relied solely upon the United States
Supreme Court cases, Frisbie v. Collins3 and Ker v. Illinois.4 The
Frisbie case approved the holding in Ker that due process of law
is given no matter how a person is brought before a court, whether
it be by force or illegality, so long as he is granted constitutional
procedural safeguards while on trial.5
Only two cases have previously interpreted the West Virginia
continuing jurisdiction statute cited above. In Re Underwood6
concerns the custody of neglected and delinquent children and
Harloe v. Harloe7 the care, custody, education and maintenance
of children of divorced parents. These two cases hold that the
statute merely prevents a former decree or judgment from becoming
final and gives the trial court the authority to reopen a case and,
if evidence warrants, change the status of the child. These cases
do not affect the principal case because they do not involve, as the
latter does, commitment of a juvenile to an institution.
There is a procedure whereby a male juvenile confined to the
industrial school for offenses that are punishable by penitentiary
confinement may be returned to the court that committed him in
order that he may be committed to the penitentiary.8 However,
IW. VA.

oh. 49, art. 5, § 2 (Michie 1966).
2 (Michie 1966).
342 U.S. 519 (1952).
4119 U.S. 436 (1886).
5 Id. at 444.
6 144 W. Va. 312, 107 S.E.2d 608 (1959).
7
8 129 W. Va. 1, 38 S.E.2d 362 (1946).
W. VA. CODE oh. 28, art. 1, § 7 (Michie 1966).
CODE

2 W. VA. CoDE ch. 49, art. 5,
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this can occur only when the youth has been convicted in a court
of record for a felony and has been confined, through judicial discretion, to the industrial school.' The transfer back to the court
must be initiated by the State Commissioner of Public Institutions
after he has found a boy to be a detriment or menace to the other
youths or that the institution is unable to benefit him."° This procedure was apparently not followed in the petitioner's case nor
was it discussed by the court. However, the court did eliminate
as inapplicable State ex rel. McGilton v. Adams" and State ex rel.
Firestone v. Adams"2 which interpret this section of the Code,
stating that they stood only for the proposition that no one may
be "tried, convicted, or sentenced" for a felony unless upon presentment or indictment of a grand jury.'3 Recognizing that the
McGilton and Firestone cases do stand for such a proposition, they
seem also to have another meaning. In both cases, juveniles guilty
of auto theft were found by the West Virginia Board of Control"4
to be unsuitable for confinement in the Industrial School and were
returned to the juvenile courts which then sentenced them to the
penitentiary. The Supreme Court of Appeals granted writs of
habeas corpus in both cases. In the McGilton case the court held
that a juvenile, under the age of 18, who has been confined in the
industrial school cannot be sentenced to the penitentiary for the
same offense unless he was, in the first instance, committed to the
school after having been properly indicated and convicted of a
felony.'" The court further stated that the pentitentiary sentence,
because of the juvenile court statute, could only be imposed by
a court having criminal jurisdiction.' 6
An analysis of the McGilton and Firestone cases along with that
section of the Code concerning the transfer of juveniles from
industrial school to the penitentiary would suggest that there may
be only one way in which a male offender under the age of 18 can,
for the same offense, be removed from industrial school and sentenced to the penitentiary. That way is for the offender to: first,
be indicted and convicted for a felony; secondly, be committed to
VA. CODE ch. 28, art. 1, § 3 (Michie 1966).
§ 7 (Michie 1966).
"1
143
W. Va. 325, 102 S.E.2d 145 (1958).
12
145 W. Va. 194, 113 S.E.2d 830 (1960).
13 Brooks v. Boles, 153 S.E.2d 526, 529 (W. Va. 1967).
'4Now the State Commissioner of Public Institutions.
Is143 W. Va. 325, 102 S.E.2d 145 (1958).
16Id.at 329, 102 S.E.2d at 148.
90W.

' W. VA. CODE ch. 28, art. 1,
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the industrial school by a court exercising criminal jurisdiction;
and thirdly, be ordered by the State Commissioner of Public
Institutions, for just cause, returned to the court for sentencing.
Regardless of the fact that the intermediate court had the jurisdition to try the petitioner's case there is some room for doubt
as to whether the petitioner was, in the process that led from
industrial school to the penitentiary, afforded his full measure
of due process of law as guaranteed by the 14th amendment. In
considering the idea of due process of law in the instant case, an
important element of it is double jeopardy. This is quite apparent
from the fact that the petitioner was tried and convicted for the
same offense for which he had previously been confined to industrial school. The West Virginia statute from which the juvenile
courts derive their jurisdiction states that juvenile offenders "shall
have the protection guaranteed by article III, section 5 of the
Constitution of West Virginia.""7 The constitution states that no
one, in any criminal case, shall be twice put in jeopardy of losing
his life or liberty for the same offense. The court in the principal
case held this protection to be inapplicable because he was first
proceeded against in a juvenile court, which is legally not a criminal
proceeding. Therefore, since the constitution by express language
deals with criminal cases, the petitioner was placed in jeopardy
only once, that being when he was indicted, arraigned and entered
a plea in the intermediate court. 8 However, in some states the
possibility is realized that a juvenile may be subjected to double
jeopardy. 9 West Virginia has a statute stating that no evidence
used in juvenile court is admissible as evidence against a juvenile
in any other case in any other court except the juvenile court.2"
W. VA. CODE ch. 49, art. 5, §3 (Michie 1966).
Brooks v. Boles, 153 S.E.2d 526, 530 (W. Va. 1967); accord, People v.
Silverstein, 121 Cal. App. 2d 140, 262 P.2d 656 (1953); In re MacDonald,
153 A.2d 651 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1959).
1953 A.B.A.I. 257, 258 (1967):
Specificity of the matters on which the complaint is founded also
serves as the basis for res judicata of those particular matters heard
and disposed of, thus avoiding the child's being subjected to those
same charges at another time or place-, essentially accordance of
"double jeopardy."
A Missouri statute also prohibits evidence used in juvenile
court to be used against the child in any other court except juvenile
court.
20
W. VA. CODE ch. 49, art. 7, § 3 (Michie 1966):
Any evidence given in any case or proceeding under this chapter,
or any order, judgment or finding therein, or any adjudication upon
the status of juvenile delinquents heretofore made or rendered, shall
17

8
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A similar Ohio statute has been interpreted by one writer to be a
guard against double jeopardy."
Other cases such as Garza v. State22 and Sawyer v. Hauck,23
though not reaching the issue of double jeopardy, have held that
it is a violation of the fundamental principles of fairness and
constitutes a denial of due process of law to convict and sentence
a juvenile for the same offense for which he had been previously
confined in an industrial school.
Among the courts of the United States there seems to be no
unanimity of opinion as to whether juvenile offenders should be
afforded constitutional guarantees in the legal process as are adult
offenders. 4 The prevailing philosophy among juvenile tribunals
has been that a minor's rights are determined not from the application of clauses in the Constitution having to do with criminal cases,
but rather from the requirements of fair treatment and due
process. 21 What might be called the denial of constitutional guaranties to juvenile offenders is based upon the theoretical idea that
the state is not punishing juveniles but serving in the capacity of
parenspatriaein a reformation process."6
A possible new trend may develop as a result of the United
States Supreme Court's decisions in Kent v. United States27 and
In Re Gault." The Kent case, though ignored by the West Virginia
Court in the principal case, deals specifically with the matter of
placing juveniles before courts having criminal jurisdiction. In
remanding the case because of procedural error the Court specifically stated that a hearing and a statement of reasons are necessary,
not in any civil, criminal or other cause or proceeding whatever in
any court, be lawful or proper evidence against such child for any
purpose whatsoever except in subsequent cases under this chapter
involving the same child....
2 ,Rubin,
Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Court, 16 CrLv.-MAa. L. Rtlv.
477, 482 (1967).
22 369 S.W.2d 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963).
23 245 F. Supp. 55 (W.D. Tex. 1965) at 57 the court said that while
the juvenile court processes are civil in nature-not criminal-the constitutional
guaranty of fairness and due process are applicable to all proceedings, irrespective of whether they are denominated criminal or civil, if the outcome
may be
24 deprivation of one's liberty.
1n re Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224 (D.D.C. 1955).
2
- Rubin, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Court, 16 CLEv.-MAR. L. RE:v.
477,481
(1967).
26
State ex rel. Matacta v. Buckner, 300 Mo. 359, 254 S.W. 179 (1923).
27 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
268
387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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in order to assure constitutional safeguards, before a juvenile court
can waive its exclusive jurisdiction over a juvenile.2 9
In May 1967 the Supreme Court of the United States established
the principle that juvenile offenders should be afforded constitutional protection even though they are dealt with in courts not
exercising criminal jurisdiction.3" Generally, the case stands for
the proposition that the juvenile offender is to be afforded due
process of law guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Specifically, the case deals with the confidentiality of records, rights of
the accused, notice of hearing, waiver of jurisdiction, right to
counsel in the juvenile court and protection against self-incrimination.
That area of law dealing with juvenile offenders is one of utmost
importance in today's society and should be one free, as far as
possible, of uncertainty. Unfortunately in West Virginia the state
of the law in this important area is rather uncertain as evidenced
by the principal case. An early legislative or judicial clarification
as to a juvenile court's jurisdiction over a committed juvenile, the
proper procedure for transferring confinees of industrial school
to the penitentiary, permissible disciplinary actions concerning
industrial school confinees3" and the extent to which juvenile
offenders may be tried criminally for the same offense for which
they are committed to industrial school would seem imperative.
There is need for improvement and with the possibility of a new
trend of wider constitutional protection for juvenile offenders in
the United States, the West Virginia law may be in line for a
change. Hopefully, the idea announced in the Gault case will be
remembered, that is, the fourteenth amendment and the Bill of
Rights are for children as well as adults.
John Woodville Hatcher,Jr.
29 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) at 554: "There is no place
in our system of law for reaching a result of such tremendous consequences
without effective assistance of counsel, without a statement of reasons." Id
at 555:" [T]he admonition to function in a parental relationship is not an
invitation
to procedural arbitrainess."
30
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).

31 As the law now stands it is not clear as to who has control over an
unmanageable industrial school confinee. The principal case seems to set
forth a view that each juvenile court can discipline their own respective con-

finees. By analogy with the provision (62-8-3)

of the West Virginia Code

which provides that the prison inmates are to be dealt with in Marshall
County for wrongful acts at the penitentiary, it would seem that the juvenile
court of Taylor County should have jurisdiction over disobedient confinees
of the industrial school.
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